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Abstract
The paper firsjt presents an analysis of invention performance;
as measured by patenting activities, of six countries (France,
Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, USSR, West Germany) relative
to the United States for 41 SIC industries over the past
twenty years. It turns out that Non U.S. countries as a
whole have increased their (relative) invention performance
in all fields of technology, including high technology fields.
In the second section hypotheses which can be supposed to
explain the relative decline of the United States' patenting
activities are discussed and tested. There is strong evidence
that catching up processes as well as integration effects
contributed most to the relative decrease of the United
States; there also is evidence, that government interventions
regarding technology production have had counter-productive
effects in the United States.- 1 -
I. Introduction
1. Economic growth has been slowing down in highly industrial-
ised countries since the 1960s. Two fundamentally different ex-
planations have been put forward. One links bad growth perfor-
mance to a bad climate for investors: Incentives should be re-
structured in order to assure a higher rate of capital forma-
tion . According to the other explanation technical progress has
become too slow to compensate for the increase in the capital
coefficient; therefore, policies should aim at stimulating tech-
nical progress, either through more government research or
through government support of private research.
2. The superior growth performance of Japan and, in most re-
cent years, of the United States has been taken by European
countries to back the relevance of the technology approach:
Whilst Japan for a long time had acquired the image of mainly
imitating foreign techniques, i.e. of successfully catching up,
it is today widely held that Japan also, like the United States,
is more successful in producing new (and high) technologies than
2
Western European countries . In fact, the phrase "Eurosclerosis"
precisely describes the alleged (relative) inability of Western
Europe to innovate. Similar to the 1960s "gaps" have again been
discovered, this time in the fields of, inter alia, microelec-
tronics, communication techniques, robotics and gene engineer-
ing.
3. One way out of deficits in high technology application
would, of course, be importing technologies . However, the- 2 -
world's most important exporter of technology, the United
States, has been increasing her efforts to curtail such out-
flows. Whilst part of these efforts is strictly for military
ends, there is also a widespread feeling in the United States
that the country could lose ground technologically on account of
too many or too cheap high technology exports .
4. Quite obviously, European countries as well as the United
States suspect each other to overtake in the technologies race.
Suspicion has its roots. As far as these roots reach into the
past one can analyse which countries gained and which countries
lost in the race. With respect to past performance, at least,
somebody's suspicion must be wrong.
5. In the following it is first tried to present a complete
picture of invention performance of six countries (France,
Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, USSR, West Germany) relative to
the United States over the past twenty years. We call this
picture "complete" because all 41 industries according to the
two- and three-digit Standard Industrial Classification level
are included for the whole period . The aim of this fact-finding
section is to identify the winners, losers, and also-rans in the
technology race by industry over the past two decades. In the
second part, hypotheses to explain why some countries performed
better than others are discussed and empirically tested. Among
these hypotheses are the development of international economic
integration as well as the "research-socialism-hypothesis",- 3 -
referring to the degree of government interference in the pro-
duction of new technologies.
II. Assessment of Inventions by Country
1. Method
6. The assessment of inventive activities by country and field
of activity refers to patents granted by U.S. authorities be-
tween 1963 and 1983 . The reasons for choosing the U.S. market
are that the United States is the internationally most important
market for inventions, and that international comparisons rely-
ing on respective national statistics are misleading due to both
national peculiarities of patent laws as well as practices of
patent granting. Second, patents by date of grant are chosen
rather than by date of application since the latter would imply
either operating with an increasingly uncertain data base (in
case where only those applications are listed which eventually
lead to grants) or to include rejected applications, thereby
burdening the analysis with short and long run cyclical
problems . Also, data are analysed in "share" form, which cir-
cumvents some of these lag problems - unless, of course, U.S.
authorities have discriminated against (or in favour of) foreign
patent applications in,a manner varying over time.
The assessment has three analytical parts. One is about the
average performance of six industrial countries, including the- 4 -
USSR, measured relative to the United States between 1963 and
1983. The others are about the estimated starting position in
1963, and about the dynamics during the past two decades. It is
assumed that the number of patents granted, if only large
enough, is a reliable indicator of invention performance also in
economic terms .
7. The relative average invention performance (RAIP) of the
six countries in the 21 years under observation is measured by
the ratio of the number of patents granted to country j in the









3: for particular fields of activity in relation to
the average one for all activities corresponds to the familiar
concept of "revealed comparative advantage", commonly used in
studies of foreign trade performance.
For each field of activity in each country the following
straightforward exponential trend was calculated:
Patents. , .
•j b*t 4 = a*e
Patents
3; c
Coefficient a, the interception with the relative patent activi-
ty axis, was taken to represent the estimated relative starting
position in 1963.- 5 -
Coefficient b of the exponential trend represents the "estimated
relative dynamics" of patent activity of country j in the period
1963 to 1983. The exponential trend is chosen because of the
ease of interpretation as an indicator of. growth.
2 •
a. Average Performance Between 1963 and 198 3
8. Table Al exhibits that the number of all patents granted to
foreigners by the United States was on average 43 per cent of
9
patents granted to U.S. citizens ("domestic patenting") . The
structure of foreign invention activity reveals relative
strength in the fields of drugs and medicines (Standard Indus-
trial Classification No. 286), engines and turbines (SIC 351) ,
and five other fields out of 41 SIC sections. Comparative
strength of U.S. domestic patenting lay in the fields of petro-
leum and natural gas extraction and refining (SIC 13, 29) as
well as regarding guided missiles, space vehicles and parts (SIC
376) and some other patent fields.
9. Looking at high technology industries (defined as SIC-
fields 289, 283, 351, 354, 357, 369, 366, 367, 376, 372, 38
excl. 3825) reveals that West Germany, closely followed by Ja-
pan, had the highest country share of patents granted to Non-
U.S. citizens (table 1); however, a comparison of high technolo-
gy performance with average performance (in all fields of tech-
nology) shows Japan leading distinctly. Since all these ratios- 6 -
are comparisons with the United States one arrives at the result
that the U.S. did not perform in any way superior or even equal
Table 1: Average Relative Performance in High Technology Patenting in the
United States by Country
a
West



























tliqh technology patents granted to foreigners relative to high technology
patents granted to U.S. citizens between 1963 and 1983. Numbers in
parantheses refer to deviation from national average regarding all fields of
activity.
The figures are unweighted averages of the coefficients in table Al. E.g.
0.049 says that France had 4.9 patents granted when U.S. citizens had 100
patents. (19.5%) means that French high technology patent performance is
19.5 % above her national average in all fields of technology.
Source: Table Al.
to West Germany, Japan, the UK or France in high technologies
relative to average technologies.
b. The Starting Line: 1963
10. All in all, the number of Non-U.S. patents was less than 25
per cent of the number of patents granted to U.S. citizens in
1963. The relative starting position of foreigners was quite
good in parts of the chemical industry (SIC 281, 286, and 283),
and of machinery (SIC 351 and 355) . A comparatively weak posi-
tion of foreigners can be observed in the fields of petroleum
and gas (SIC 13 and 29) , food (SIC 20) , and soaps and related
products (SIC 284).- 7 -
11. As regards intercountry differences, West Germany and the
United Kingdom had a leading position, with Japan and France
following far behind. The USSR was of virtually no account.
12. In the high technology fields West Germany and the United
Kingdom again held about the same starting position (table 2).
Table 2: Relative Starting Position in High Technology Patenting in the
United States by Country
a
West
France Italy Japan UK USSR Germany Non-U.S.
0.042 0.007 0.024 0.073 0.002 0.076 0.27
(+53.7%) (-11.3%) (+27.4%) (+37.7%) (+50%) (+17.1%) (+13.5%)
As of 1963. Numbers in parantheses refer to deviation from national average.
Interpretation as in table 1.
Source: Table A2.
When compared to the individual country's relative average
performance France, together with the USSR, did particularly
well in high technology industries in 1963. In addition, table
A2 indicates that West Germany had in almost every respect (i.e.
compared to her averages and to other countries) a strong
position in the field of guided missiles, space vehicles and
parts (SIC 376) ; even stronger, incidentally, was her position
in other fields of military relevance (SIC 348, 3795, 372) -
which is surprising in view of the heavy allied regulation of




13. Whilst average performance as well as the starting position
give information on patterns gone, dynamics - i.e. the change in
invention performance relative to the United States - provides
information also on recent developments. Non-U.S. patenting per
annum rose 6 percentage points faster than U.S. patenting (table
A3) . Since OTAF data show that the U.S. patenting trend alone
12 had a slightly negative slope the absolute number of Non-U.S.
patents grew by less than 6 %.
Comparative advantage of Non-U.S. inventors increased most obvi-
ously in the case of radio and television equipment (SIC 365) ,
miscellaneous machinery (SIC 359) , and soaps, detergents, etc.
(SIC 284) . Patent development of the United States did loose
least ground - but nevertheless lost ground - in the fields of
ordnance (SIC 348 + 3795) , guided missiles (SIC 376) , and
inorganic chemistry (SIC 281) . It is quite remarkable that the
indicators of relative dynamics exhibit a but small variance
across the fields of patent activities: The growth rate of the
best performing field of Non-U.S. patent holders (SIC 365) was
only 2.7 percentage points above average, worst performance was
some 3.3 points below average (SIC 348+3795).
14. Inter-country differences are such that the dynamics of pa-
tent grants was most rapid in the case of Japan, with the USSR
in her wake. All other countries' dynamics was below Non-U.S.
average, although above U.S. performance; the United Kingdom was- 9 -
- besides the United States - slowest. Some peculiarities show
up when looking at the levels of significance and at the sign of
coefficients (table 3): West Germany's, Japan's, and the Soviet
Union's trend of relative patent dynamics is significant in all
fields of activity; the trends calculated for these countries
also indicate, with the only exception of guided missiles in the
case of West Germany (and disregarding the four missing































































observations in the case of the USSR) a significantly superior
performance as compared to the United States. Of the patents
given to France and Italy some 15 % of the dynamics-coefficients
by industry are insignificant, but in the remaining 85 % almost
all exhibit a superior performance, too. The United Kingdom
plays an exceptional r6le among Non-U.S. patent holders in that
half of the coefficients are insignificant - i.e. dynamics does
not differ much from that of the United States; five of the- 10 -
remaining 21 industries reveal negative relative dynamics.
15. Relative dynamics in high technology patenting was highest
in Japan, followed by the USSR (still table 3) . The United
Kingdom's performance was less than 1 percentage point above
that of the United States.
Of a surprising uniformity is the deviation of high technology
patenting trends from overall patenting trends. Not one of the
Non-U.S. countries considered had a particular strength in the
high technology area: total performance off all countries was
more or less superior to high technology performance. Or, to put
it differently, the United States lost least ground in the high
technology fields as compared to the other sectors.
Ill. Explanations; Why the U.S. Has Been Falling Behind
1. Hypotheses
16. The analysis has shown that the United States' share in pa-
tent grants has decreased across all fields of inventive acti-
vity. This seems to confirm to apprehensions in the public de-
bate in the United States about a decline in technological com-
petitiveness, and it seems to contradict fears currently articu-
lated in Western Europe about a widening technological gap to
the United States. Whether this decrease implies that the United- 11 -
States has really lost in the technological race is still an
open question. For example, for the same rate of technological
advance, an appreciation in the exchange rate will bring in more
imports, and along with it a greater incentive for foreign
exporters to patent the technology content of their products.
The diagnosis of a decline in technological advance relative to
other countries would thus have to eliminate "disturbing noises"
coming in from exchange rates and from rising international
trade patterns.
One may speak of a "real" loosing out in the technological race
if other countries advance faster due, in particular, to catch-
ing up processes or due to more efficient economic institutions.
If, for example, the United States is the technologically lead-
ing country, other countries
1 catching up would imply a rela-
tively declining share in domestic patent grants beyond what
would have to be expected anyhow on account of increasing trade
patterns. The same effects may occur in case economic policies
in the United States disencourage domestic inventors.
17. In the following, five hypotheses contributing to explain
invention performance in the United States by country relative
to the United States will be tested. This will not be done in-
dustrywise, as tables Al to A3 might suggest, but for the total
of patenting activities, and for the high-technology subtotal.
The reasons are that (1) grosso modo the performance of the six
countries in the United States does not vary much across
industries, as table 3 has shown, that (2) problems of concor-- 12 -
dance between patent classes and SIC categories are avoided by
aggregation, and that (3) a consistent set of data by industry
and country for the explanatory variables is not available.
Since the empirical evidence pertains to changes in relative in-
vention performance over the past twenty years, all those peren-
nial features of invention activities which Taussig and others
discussed - like: why do inventors invent, or: what skills and
incentives does it take to create new technologies - can be
14 assumed to be of minor importance . As far as institutional
determinants of inventive activity are concerned, changes in the
systems of education, in international migration of highly
skilled people, and in the macroeconomic structure of production
are assumed to have not been decisive for patenting patterns
over the past two decades. The assumption of constancy of
institutional determinants may be regarded questionable because
the foundation of the European Patent office as well as the
standardisation of procedures of patent application in the
framework of the World Industrial Property Organisation (WIPO)
have changed the conditions for international patenting. How-
ever, these changes occured not before the late seventies and
anyhow should not have affected country performance in relative
terms.
18. The hypotheses which will be tested are
(a) the international integration hypothesis (II-hypothesis),
(b) the catching-up hypothesis (CU-hypothesis),
(c) the free enterprise hypothesis (FE-hypothesis),Bibliothek des Institute
fur Weltwirtschaft Kiel
- 13 -
(d) the research socialism hypothesis (RESOC-hypothesis),
(e) the inertia of aggregates hypothesis (LAG-hypothesis).
(a) The II-Hypothesis predicts that patenting activities in
foreign countries depend on (and change along with) the degree
of mutual economic interlocking . An increase in exports of new
goods and new modes of production makes it profitable to also
secure against imitations by the importing countries. Thus, the
upsurge of worldwide agreements to liberalise international
trade and capital flows beginning in the late 1940s should have
also positively affected international flows of technology - not
only incorporated technologies but also technological exchange
as such. A relative increase in the number of patents granted to
foreigners by United States
1 authorities thus would not neces-
sarily indicate an increase in technological competitiveness of
foreign countries but an increase in the incentive to apply for
patent protection in the United States. To put it differently:
If returns from international appropriability rise as a result
of an increase in international trade one might expect the
domestic share of the "home" country (here the U.S.) to have
fallen in all countries - without it implying a "real" deterio-
ration of the country's performance.
The indicator chosen to capture the relevance of the II-hypothe-
sis is total trade (exports plus imports) of the United States
with the particular country as per cent of U.S.
1 gross domestic
product; the expected sign of the coefficient is positive.- 14 -
(b) CU-hypothesis: Generally, countries catching up can be ex-
pected to increase their capability in inventive activities be-
cause overall educational standards rise and high scientific and
engineering qualifications become more frequent. Technologically
backward countries are characterised by, first, a scope for
catching up through technological imitation, and, second, by a
comparatively low capacity to adopt the leading country's new
technologies . Catching up would then imply a decrease in the
scope for imitation and a rise in the returns on own inventions.
Therefore one should expect e.g. French patenting activities in
the United States (as well as in France) to increase with catch-
ing up. In case the capacity to adopt foreign technologies rises
with catching up, this should induce corresponding increases in
the capacity to invent.
Catching up will be defined as the per capita income (PCI) ratio
of each country to the United States (=
 PCIForeign country/
PCI ). PCIs are measured at constant international prices ac-
U t> A
cording to the Kravis/Summers/Heston work, thereby avoiding er-
rors due to fluctuating exchange rates
The CU-variable being defined as above one would expect a posi-
tive correlation with the foreign country's patenting activity
in the United States. A problem to be aware of is that the de-
velopment of per capita income differentials not only reflects
growth differentials but also relative business cycles, if
computed on an annual basis. However, business cycle analyses
show that in the period under consideration, especially in the- 15 -
1970s, business cycles in the United States, in Japan, France,
West Germany, in the United Kingdom, and in Italy were factually
18 closely synchronised
(c) The main two sources of R&D finance are government funds
19 and companies' own funds . Often, government expenditures aim
at national interests, like national security, or at keeping up
a high level of innovation, rather than at companies' interests,
like profit seeking in commercial markets. It can be expected
that both sources have therefore a different impact on national
invention performance. The "free enterprise" variable, measured
as the ratio of a country's companies' own funds as percent of
total R&D expenditures relative to the same ratio for the United
States, is to explain whether the relative decline of U.S.
invention performance can be explained by relatively decreasing
companies expenditures of R&D.
(d) Regarding government funds for R&D expenditures (RESOC) two
variables seem worth testing: One is about government expendi-
tures for R&D not performed within the government sector; this
NP variable is measured as a country's public R&D funds minus
expenditures for government performed R&D in percent of total
R&D expenditures (relative to the United States) . The other
RESOC variable refers to government's non defense R&D expendi-
tures (ND), defined as a country's public R&D funds minus expen-
ditures for government's defense R&D. The NP and ND measure
overlap, as can be seen in graph 1. The shaded area in graph 1
is Non Defense, the dotted area is Non Performed. The bleak- 16 -
outer area is R&D financed by









companies' own funds. Of course, it would be interesting to also
seperately include the bleak inner space; this core area
comprises defense R&D performed in the government sector.
However, it seems impossible to obtain internationally
comparable data in this respect, not even by inference.
The expected sign of the RESOC variables is unsure, at least
20
debatable . The authors' prior is that R&D under public control
is less efficient, and that efficiency decreases with the- 17 -
intensity of control. Thus, the stronger a government's inter-
ference in overall R&D activities, the less efficient the coun-
21 try should be in overall invention performance . Indeed,
markets for technologies seem to have always been at the very
heart of government interventions, be it due to defence and
(today) space research requirements, or to simply keep the
economy in a technologically leading position, or to close
"gaps" to other nations. Different intensities of intervention
in the countries under consideration would thus result in
differing patent performance. If it is true, for instance, that
the United States has become increasingly restrictive regarding
export of high technologies, U.S. inventive activities can be
expected to have slowed down. Such restrictions - which have
been based on a number of provisions, like the "Atomic Energy
Act" (1976) , the "Invention Secrecy Act" (1951) , the "Arms
Export Control Act" (1976) , the "International Emerging Economic
Power Act" (1977), the "Export Administration Act" (1978)
2
2 -
generally discriminate technology producing U.S. companies by
reducing their revenues from abroad. In the short run, U.S.
buyers may profit from an increased supply when American
producers have no choice but to sell domestically; in the long
run, however, domestic price decreases together with the
artificially reduced foreign demand provide disincentives for
U.S. technology producers.
Despite these considerations arguments can also be found which
back the opposite prior, namely that government financed R&D can
23 have a generic function in the invention process . It is for- 18 -
this ambivalance that the following empirical test will use the
more rigorous two-tail test of the RESOC variables.
(e) In addition, the lag variable will be introduced in the
time series analysis. This variable is commonly used to solve
econometric problems in order to arrive at estimates unbiased by
serial correlation. I.e. all variables that might have an im-
portant effect besides integration, catching up, and the ways of
R&P financing should be caught by this procedure. Corresponding-
ly, the Durbin h-statistic had to be applied instead of the
simple Durbin-Watson-statistic. A reader interested in the total
magnitudes of the impact of the exogenous variables, and about
the number of years it takes to achieve complete adjustment to
changes in these variables may also interprete the lag variable
as the familiar Koyck-lag"
2. Results
19. Table A4 gives the results of regressions performed. All
estimated equations are of the double-logarithmic type because
of the ease of interpretation; since the statistics applied are
highly aggregated there is no "zero-problem". The endogenous
variable, relative invention performance in the United States,
was specified in two ways: one is concerned with all fields of
patent activity, the other only with high technology fields. The
pool analysis refers to the combination of all country data,
making problems of serial correlation less important.
20. Pool results indicate that the integration and catching up- 19 -
parameters estimated (as well . as the total equation) are
statistically significant at the 5 % level for all fields of
technology as well as for high technology patenting; the signs
are as expected. Of the RESOC variables non defense R&D financed
by government is significant and negative, both for all.fields
of technology and for high technology production. Companies own
R&D funds (the FE variable) shows no significant impact on
relative invention performance in three out of the four pool
equations. It should be noted, that the data pool is without the
USSR due to the lack of data for the ND, NP and FE variables.
At first glance the first two pool equations contradict with
respect to the ND and FE variable.The econometric explanation is
multicollinearity: FE and ND are negatively correlated. The two
estimates say that a high share of companies' own funds improves
a country's patenting performance and a high share of government
R&D subsidies disimproves it - which seems to be confirmation of
the same message by the two different estimates.
21. Individual country results vary around the pool estimates,
as should be expected. Grosso modo, also time series analyses
confirm the relevance of the hypotheses tested, though with less
force.
- The integration effect is particularly weak in the case of
West Germany and Italy (for all industries as well as for high
technology fields).
- Catching up, the strongest explanatory variable regarding
significance levels and expected signs, in time serie shows- 20 -
distinctly lower levels of significance as compared to the
pool regression.
- RESOC is only significant in some cases ; in these cases,
however, signs are negative like in the pool regression.
- The FE variable turns out to be the weakest. Except for West
Germany (all industries) and Italy (high technology fields)
the companies
1 own efforts did not significantly influence
relative invention performance in the United States. The two
exceptions exhibit the "wrong sign" in terms of the prior
described above.
As should be expected the LAG variable in the time series
regressions is quite strong, implying that a considerable part
of current invention performance is determined by past perfor-
mance.
22. The country regressions, however, seem to improve with
closer inspection. Table 4 summarizes the results. A fair
judgement should suggest that the variables II, CU, LAG and the
NP variant of RESOC (excluding high technology fields) turn out
to explain the relative decline of the United States invention
performance quite well: In no case the prior (i.e. the expected
sign) is refuted and the worst result is insignificance. Random
events would be different, either by being insignificant or by
showing up with wrong signs.
23. Together with the pool results, the "best" variables in
i
terms of t-statistics seem to be international integration and
catching-up, the least efficient is the "free enterprise"
i hypothesis. As regards the increase in international- 21 -
















































































5 % level (10 % level in brackets). - Two-tail test.
Source: Table A4.- 22 -
integration which no doubt has taken place over the past twenty
years, this variable may exaggerate the true impact of integra-
tion on relative U.S. performance: The integration effect is the
only one tested of a two way nature; the integrating country
should also exhibit tendencies like the United States, i.e. an
increasing share of foreign patenting. However, it has been
shown that the share of U.S. patenting in industrial countries
24 has been declining since the early seventies
24. In terms of significance levels, catching up is slightly,
though systematically less important in the field of high tech-
nologies as compared to all technologies. The reason seems
straightforward: High technologies very often are of military
importance, and thereby under close government surveillance.
Thus, access to leading countries
1 high technologies is more
difficult for foreign countries; at the same time high techno-
logy research results of other countries are under control, too,
which means that patenting abroad is not of first order im-
portance for them.
25. Research socialism is of explanatory power, too; it helps
explain why some countries have improved their position in com-
parison to the United States by relatively decreasing interven-
tions (like the United Kingdom; see also the height and direc-
tion of minima and maxima in table A4).
An outstanding example of the importance of RESOC should be the
USSR. Relative measurement is easy in this case because go-
vernment control in the USSR can be assumed to be 100 %, which- 23 -
means that - due to the expanding share of government performed
research in the United States - her relative RESOC indicator has
decreased in the period under consideration. Calculations in
order to explain_ the USSR's invention performance are shown in
the bottom rows of table A4. As far as the t-statistics of the
regression coefficients is concerned, integration is most power-
ful in explaining the Soviet Unions' success on U.S. invention
markets, regarding all fields of technology as well as high tech-
nology inventions. RESOC matters, too. Catching up is of no impor-
tance, which would imply that inventive activities in the USSR
are quite independent from the stage of economic development as
measured by relative per capita incomes.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
26. The assessment of invention performance by country revealed
that Non-U.S. countries as a whole have increased their share in
patenting on the U.S. market significantly in all fields of
technology, including high technology fields. Among the six
foreign countries considered the United Kingdom's performance
was closest to that of the United States. Japan and West Germany
have been the most successful of the foreign countries, which
clearly contradicts apprehensions articulated in European coun-
tries.
27 . Why has the United States been falling behind? Three ans-
wers follow from the analysis:- 24 -
other countries have caught up to the United States regard-
ing per capita incomes;
integration with foreign countries has effectively increased
the incentives to apply for patents in the United States;
United States interventions in the field of technology
production have diminished the efficiency of the research
system.
These answers come out quite clearly, i.e. without inherent con-
tradictions like changes in sign; the evidence, however, is not
as strong as is usual when correlating national accounts data.
The first answer circumscribes an increase in international
technology competition. New sources of supply have enlarged
world inventive output and have diminished the importance of
U.S. technologies. The second answer says that the decline of
economic distances among countries has increased competition on
product and factor markets with corresponding effects on patent-
ing activities. The third answer is about voluntary restraints
of technology supply by the United States herself.- 25 -
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Table Al: International Comparison of Inventive Activities























































Plastics Materials S Synthetic Resins
Agricultural Chemicals
Soaps, Detergents, Cleaners, Perfumes,
Cosmetics 4 Toiletries




Petroleum & Natural Gas Extraction
4 Refining
Rubber 4 Miscellaneous Plastics Products
Stone, Clay, Glass and Concrete Products
Primary Ferrous Products
Primary & Secondary Non-Ferrous Metals
Fabricated Metal Products
Engines 4 Turbines
Farm 4 Garden Machinery 4 Equipment
Construction, Mining 4 Material Handling
Machinery 4 Equipment
Metal Working Machinery 4 Equipment
Office Computing 4 Accounting Machines
Special Industry Machinery, Except Metal
Working Machinery
General Industrial Machinery 4 Equipment
Refrigeration 4 Service Industry Machinery
Miscellaneous Machinery, Except Electrical




Electrical Lighting 4 Wiring Equipment
Miscellaneous Electrical Machinery,
Equipment 4 Supplies
Radio 4 Television Receiving Equipment
Except Communication Types
Electronic Components 4 Accessories
4 Communication Equipment
Motor Vehicles 4 Motor Vehicle Equipment
Guided Missiles 4 Space Vehicles 4 Parts
Ship & Boat Building 4 Repairing
Railroad Equipment


























































































































































































by patents granted in the United States. Inventive activities are measured by
Number of patents granted to country i
























































































































































































Source: Office of Technology Assessment and Forecast, U.S. Patent and Trademake Office: OTAF Custom Report 1963-1983.
Own calculations.- 29 -
Table A2:International Comparison of Inventive Activities






















































Plastics Materials 4 Synthetic Resins
Agricultural Chemicals -
Soaps, Detergents, Cleaners, Perfumes,
Cosmetics 4 Toiletries




Petroleum 4 Natural Gas Extraction
4 Refining
lubber 4 Miscellaneous Plastics Products
Stone, Clay, Glass and Concrete Products
'rimary Ferrous Products
Primary 4 Secondary Non-Ferrous Metals
Fabricated Metal Products
Engines 4 Turbines
Farm 4 Garden Machinery 4 Equipment
Construction, Mining 4 Material Handling
Machinery 4 Equipment
Metal Working Machinery 4 Equipment
Office Computing & Accounting Machines
Special Industry Machinery, Except Metal
Working Machinery
General Industrial Machinery 4 Equipment
Refrigeration 4 Service Industry Machinery
Miscellaneous Machinery, Except Electrical




Electrical Lighting 4 Wiring Equipment
Miscellaneous Electrical Machinery,
Equipment 4 Supplies
Radio 4 Television Receiving Equipment
Except Communication Types
Electronic Components 4 Accessories
4 Communication Equipment
Motor Vehicles 4 Motor Vehicle Equipment
Guided Missiles 4 Space Vehicles 4 Parts
Ship 4 Boat Building 4 Repairing
Railroad Equipment







































































































































































































































by patents granted in the United States. Inventive activities are measured by:
Number of patents granted to country i tU
Number of patents granted to the United States











































































































































Source: Office of Technology Assessment and Forecast, U.S. Patent and Tradem.ike Office: OTAF Custom Report 1%3-iySJ.
Own calculations.Table A3: International Comparison of Inventive Activities













































Plastics Materials & Synthetic Resins
Agricultural Chemicals
Soaps, Detergents, Cleaners, Perfumes,
Cosmetics & Toiletries




Petroleum & Natural Gas Extraction
& Refining ;;
Rubber 4 Miscellaneous Plastics Products
Stone, Clay, Glass and Concrete Products
Primary Ferrous Products
Primary 4'Secondary Non-Ferrous Metals
Fabricated Metal Products
Engines S Turbines
Farm & Garden Machinery 4 Equipment
Construction, Mining 4 Material Handling
Machinery 4 Equipment
Metal Working Machinery 4 Equipment
Office Computing 4 Accounting Machines
Special Industry Machinery, Except Metal
Working Machinery
General Industrial Machinery 4 Equipment
Refrigeration 4 Service Industry Machinery
Miscellaneous Machinery, Except Electrical




Electrical Lighting 4 Wiring Equipment
Miscellaneous Electrical Machinery,
Equipment 4 Supplies


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Electronic Components 4 Accessories
4 Communication Equipment
Motor Vehicles & Motor Vehicle Equipment
Guided Missiles & Space Vehicles & Parts
Ship 4 Boat Building & Repairing
Railroad Equipment











































































































































































aAs measured by patents granted in the United States. Inventive activities are measured by:
Number of patents granted to country i United SCates_ _ bStandard Induscrial classification of the Number of patents granted to the United States

























Source: Office of Technology Assessment and Forecast, U.S. Patent and Trademake Office: OTAF Custom Report 1963-1983.
Own calculations.- 32 -


























































































1.89** 0.19** 1.91** -0.24
(7.25) (2.27) (5.93) (-1.21)
0.13(1) 0.64(2) 0.21(14)
" 0.40(17) 0.85(19) 0.41(18)
1.80** 0.21** 1.70**
(7.48) (2.06) (7.00)
1.32** 0.21 1.64** -0.49*















1.31** 0.25* 0.68 -0.39*
(2.29) (1.74) (0.79) (-1.81)
0.24(1) 0.61(4) 0.23(8)




































































































































































































































































































































































































































t-statistics in brackets under each coefficient; **: Significant at the 5 % level; *: Significant at the 10 % level (one-
tail test for the II, CU and LAG variables, two-tail test for RESOC- and PF- variables) . - In the case of the USSR RESOC has
been tested by referring to the share of R & D performed by the government sector relative to the United States (excluding
universities). - The minimum and maximum figures indicate the exogenous variables' height, variation, and direction nf
change, reaching from 1 (for 1964) to 20 (for 1983) . - uefined as Miscellaneous Chemical Products (SIC 281), Drugs and Medi-
cines (283), Engines and Turbines (351), Metal Working Machinery and Equipment (354) , Office Computinq and Accounting Ma-
chines (357) , Misc. Electrical Machinery, Equipment and Supplies (369), Electronic Components and Accessories and Communica-
tions Equipment (366, 367), Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles and Parts (376) , Aircraft and Parts (372), Professional and
Scientific Instruments (38 excl. 3825). -
 epassim. - No serial correlation at the 5 % level of significance.
Source: As tables Al to A3. - R. SUMMERS, ALAN HESTON: Improved International Comparisons of Real Product and Its Composi-
tion: 1950 - 1980. In: The Review of Income and Wealth, Series 30, 1984. - OECD: Trade by Commodities, Series C,
Paris, current issues. - NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD: Science Indicators 1982, Report of the National Srience Board 1983,
Washington 1983. - Own calculations.